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Abstract. This study aims at testing and improving the existing instruments of the 
urban toponyms’ analysis. This study focuses on the renaming of 2,445 streets in 22 regional 
centers of Ukraine, which took place during the 2010ies. Author of this study argues that there 
is a considerable difference between the announced and the real values of the vast majority 
of Ukrainians. The newly adopted street nomenclature in Ukraine’s regional centers reflects 
the balance between various ideological influences and powers. It imposes values that are 
regarded as acceptable by the decision-makers at both national and local levels, and by the 
majority of local political activists. This study defines the signs of the balance of values for 
every region of Ukraine. 
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Toponym nomenclature policies that have been carried out in Ukraine during the 2010s 
provide an extraordinary content-rich material for researches. Ukraine, being the most 
populous among post-Soviet countries (except Russia), is rich in resources. The spread 
between Russia and the European Union, Ukraine has undergone major changes during 
the 2010s, being the subject and object of geopolitical shifts. 
This has only been one case in a series of numerous changes in Ukraine over the 
course of past five centuries. In the 16th–18th centuries, some northern parts of modern 
Ukraine’s territory were owned, as well as politically and culturally influenced, by the 
Tsardom of Muscovy, while the wide parts North of the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov 
were controlled by Muslim lords of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire (Plokhy 
2015: 65–66, 74). Meanwhile, the other territories were the domain of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, which brought about political, social and cultural change, 
until the great uprising of Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks in 1648–1650s (Plokhy 2015: 
60). The leader of the uprising Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky was victorious in several 
battles against Polish-Lithuanian armies but failed to maintain a stable independent 
state. According to his decision, the Ukrainian new military estate (the Zaporozhian 
Cossacks) would become vassals of the Tsardom of Muscovy (Plokhy 2015: 97–107). The 
lands of the Zaporozhian Cossacks (the territory of several modern regions/oblasts in the 
central and northeastern parts of Ukraine) would become controlled and influenced by 
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Moscow. Ukrainian Orthodox clergy were powerful supporters of the incorporation of 
Ukraine into the Russian Empire. The clergy strengthened the development and 
expansion of this empire (Plokhy 2015: 118–146). 
In the last quarter of the 18th century, the Russian Empire annexed the lands of the 
Crimean Khanate and some of the Ottoman Empire, which included the territory of the 
Crimean Peninsula, modern Odessa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson regions, together with some 
other territories. In addition, the empire annexed the lands of modern Vinnytsia, 
Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Volyn regions, and some other Polish possessions in 
Ukraine. Likewise, the Habsburg Empire, the owner of Zakarpattia region since 1699, 
annexed the lands of modern Chernivtsi, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lviv regions (the 
borders are approximated) in the 18th century (Plokhy 2015: 139–145). During the period 
between 1918–1939, the most territories populated by ethnic Ukrainians have been 
unified under the rule of Bolsheviks in the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). At 
the same time, several western regions were under the control of Polish, Czechoslovakian, 
and Romanian states.  
As a result, over the course of almost five centuries the territory of Ukraine 
belonged simultaneously to very different states and civilizations featuring different 
religions, traditions, political cultures, and heroes. The states fought among themselves 
and provided hostile propaganda campaigns against each other. Furthermore, they often 
supported separatism inside the states of their competitors in Ukrainian lands.  
During the 18th–19th centuries the extensive former possessions of the Tatar Khans 
near the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov have been inhabited by the flows of colonists of 
Ukrainian, Russian, German, Bulgarian, Serbian, and many other ethnic origins (Plokhy 
2015: 141–142). These lands have become considerably industrialized and Russified. 
Consequently, their local populations have turned less inclined towards Ukrainian ethnic 
nationalist ideology than the population of central and western regions of Ukraine 
(Plokhy 2015: 226–227, 234). 
During the time between the 1990s–2010s, street renaming has become an 
important tool and an issue in Ukrainian politics. The scale of this process is impressive: 
in 2016 alone, according to the statement of the UINM (Ukrainian Institute of National 
Memory, the central executive body operating under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine), 
around 51,000 streets in Ukraine have been renamed (UINP 2016). It is important to point 
out that many thousands were also renamed before and after 2016. 
Looking back at the history of the 18th–20th centuries, one can see that the 
renaming of toponyms was often a satellite of the change in ideology, elite, and power. 
The intentions of many renamers were resolute, and the investments in the renaming 
great. It suggests that they have considered the toponym renaming a highly important 
matter. 
For instance, in February 1919, the Bolsheviks initiated a discussion about 
renaming the streets in Kyiv, just 2 weeks after coming into power there. The list of 36 
new street names has been finalized by the authorities just five weeks after this initiative 
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(VKKRRD 1919). By the end the USSR era, more than 100,000 toponyms in Ukraine have 
been “painted” in the colors of Soviet ideology. 
The names of cities, towns and streets are an effective instrument of promotion of 
official ideology among populations. They become a part of citizens’ personal data, their 
biographies and lives. The street name shields work as an outdoor advertisement: they 
remind one about a certain brand. That is to say, a political brand or a component of 
ideology. It seems plausible that new toponyms express to a certain degree the mission, 
the vision, and the strategy of the decision-makers in the (re)naming. 
Since the 1990s the number of researches focused on the issues of toponym 
renaming has risen significantly. This is partly due to multiple waves of toponyms 
renaming as a result of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. 
Additionally, it has been partly due to the development of historiography in postcolonial 
countries. The works of many prominent researchers of toponym naming―J. Vuolteenaho, 
L. Berg, R. Kearns, M. Azaryahu among them―have been included in the book “Critical 
Toponymies: The Contested Politics of Place Naming,” an interdisciplinary collection that 
emphasizes the inevitably political character of place naming, thus considering place 
naming a political practice and a question of power (Berg & Vuolteenaho 2009).  
Hundreds of researches and thousands of journalists have covered the practices of 
street renaming carried in various American, African, Asian, and European cities under 
various circumstances. As it was shown, the process of renaming was often painful for 
large groups of people, resulting in not just zealous debates, but also in vandalism, riots, 
and sometimes in international conflicts (Kadmon 2004; Street 2017). 
Countries that share similarities are the most preferable objects in comparing 
street renaming practices. Neighboring countries seem to be good candidates. Poland is 
more homogenous than Ukraine in terms of ethnicity and religion. Though the dominant 
religion of Poland differs from that of Ukraine, around half of Ukraine’s territory has for 
several centuries fallen under the rule of the Polish state. In the 20th century, both 
countries were in the same camp of the so-called socialist states under the rule of 
Moscow. 
For this reason, the languages and many traditions of these 2 countries were closely 
related. In this regard, the paper by Bartłomiej Różycki (2017) is highly noteworthy. He 
focuses on street renaming through the process of decommunization in the cities of 
Warsaw, Kraków, and Wroclaw. The patrons (commemorated themes, categories of objects) 
replacing communist names are categorized as follows:  
1. Independence struggle and interwar period. 
2. World War II. 
3. Anti-communist opposition. 
4. Local activists. 
5. Restored traditional names. 
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6. Patrons unrelated to the city. 
7. New patrons related to the communism. 
8. Neutral, non-symbolic names. 
The study describes distinctions among the cities in the majority of the categories. 
It also shows possible causes for this being the differences in the history of these cities. 
Examples of that include the influence of German culture on the history of Wroclaw, the 
rich Polish heritage in Kraków, and Warsaw’s status as the capital of modern Poland. One 
of the most interesting results shows that local memory is often incompatible with the 
dominant narrative of commemoration. In such a case, new street names can be either 
the symbols from the dominant narrative or non-symbolic, neutral names. The number of 
neutral new names is higher in Wroclaw than in Warsaw and Kraków, mainly because 
Wroclaw's local memory is mostly incompatible with the dominant (Polish) narrative 
(Różycki 2017). 
Perhaps the paper of Różycki would be more informative if it had touched upon a 
wider range of Polish cities. Wroclaw was only the fourth largest Polish city by population, 
while Warsaw, Kraków, and Łódź stood at the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd positions, respectively. 
In 2011, a group of 11 researchers has published the result of their analysis of the 
toponyms of eight Central European cities (Stiperski et. al. 2011). The researchers have 
distinguished a number of groups and subgroups divided by several criteria. Ultimately, 
they have come to a conclusion that the cities’ identity, culture, history, and political 
processes were reflected in the names of the streets.  
A study conducted by eight Slovak authors (Bucher et. al. 2013) provides methods 
and findings applicable to the research of Ukrainian toponyms. In spite of differences in 
populations size and levels of European integration, both countries possess many 
similarities. In the 16th and 17th centuries, parts of both Ukraine and Slovakia have been 
battlefields in wars between Christian and Ottoman armies. Both of these neighboring 
Slavic countries were a part of empires throughout the 19th century. Some regions of 
Ukraine and Slovakia were parts of the Habsburg Empire. Both countries have had a short 
period of independence in the first half of the 20th century, they have been controlled by 
Moscow for around four decades after World War II, and both gained independence in 
early 1990ies. Finally, Ukraine and Slovakia have lower per capita income than their 
Western neighbors, developed industry, and large ethnic and religious minorities in 21st 
century.  
Following the interdisciplinary approach based on the methodology suggested by 
Stiperski et al. (2011), the Slovak researchers have analyzed the names of 520 toponyms 
(mostly streets, but also the names of squares and parks situated in the historical centers 
of the cities) from eight regional cities (centers of autonomous regions) of Slovakia 
(Bucher et. al., 2013). The analyzed toponyms were divided into the groups of 
Personalities (with 5 subgroups by the fields, branches of personality’s activities), 
Geography (with 3 subgroups), Historic Events & Institutions, Crafts & Trade, and Other. 
Additionally, they were categorized according to a space scale: local, regional, national, 
and an international scale. As an example, the names of international scale are those that 
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have to do with people, events or concepts outside of Slovakia (Wilson Embankment, John 
Paul II Square, and the like). The toponyms on international scale constated 13% of all 
toponyms in all eight cities. However, the capital city Bratislava appeared to be the leader 
in the use of international toponyms: they constituted 20% of all toponyms of the Slovak 
capital  
The main conclusion of the Slovak researchers is that the nomenclature of streets, 
squares, parks, and other public spaces depends on the collective identity of the city’s 
population. Cultural and historical development of certain urban population can be 
defined through their toponymic nomenclature. Thus urban toponyms are indicators of 
ideological perceptions of the political, social, and historical events in the context of the 
Central European region (Bucher et. al. 2013). 
Ukrainian toponymy is being studied well these days. However, these studies are 
mainly focused only on one to several regions of Ukraine (Homanyuk 2017; Takhtaulova 
2015; Shtejnle 2018), while others (though covering all the country thematically) do not 
contain an analysis of diverse aspects (especially, quantitative aspects) of street renaming 
(Shevel 2016; Törnquist-Plewa & Yurchuk 2017; Kravchenko 2018; Majorov et. al. 2017).  
Some methodological approaches of the abovementioned Slovak research were 
applied in the studies of Ukrainian researcher Oleksiy Gnatiuk (2018). Gnatiuk has 
analyzed the (re)naming of the toponyms in 36 Ukrainian cities with a population of more 
than 100,000 people, for the period from February 2014 to the middle of 2017. Only the 
cities situated in the territory controlled by Ukrainian government were the object of the 
research. Within the cities selected for research, new names of all streets (streets, lanes, 
squares, passages, avenues, embankments, and other similar elements of city’s 
infrastructure are included to the category of Streets in his article) have been 
analyzed―and not only limited to the historical centers. 
Overall there were 2,897 (re)named objects in the selected cities. Gnatiuk has 
distinguished 2 main categories of these toponyms:  
1. Restored historical names. 
2. Non-historical names (the object has never borne such a name 
before). 
Furthermore, researcher divided the non-historical names into 3 groups: Topographic, 
Commemorative, and Poetic (or Figurative) names. In addition, commemorative names 
were further classified by several criteria: political and military names with the division 
into subgroups, “according to the respective historical context: Kievan Rus; Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth; Cossack State; Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires; 
Ukrainian Struggle for Independence in 1917–1922; Soviet Union; Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army and related liberation movements; Independent Ukraine,” and  other names. Equally 
important, all commemorative names were divided into 3 groups, according to the 
relation of their local, regional, and national context (Gnatiuk 2018) 
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There are many interesting particular findings in regard to different regions and 
aspects in the Gnatiuk’s article. However, some aspects of the renaming of the Ukrainian 
urban streets still need to be clarified. 
1. The period between 2014–2017 needs to be added by its pre-history and 
post-history, its wider context, in order to understand the process in the 
whole decade dynamics. 
2. Some thematic aspects of new names of streets should be considered for 
better understanding of the connections between the decision makers’ 
(national and local government, as well as the majority of politically active 
local population) convictions, values, strategies, as well as their reflection 
in the street names. 
During the decade of the 2010s, the peak of renaming activities was reached 
between 2015–2016. This was caused directly by the adoption of the Laws of Ukraine 
“On Condemning the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes and 
Prohibiting the Propagation of their Symbols” and “On the Legal Status and Honoring of 
the Memory of the Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine in the 20th Century” in the 
spring of 2015. The first law obliged authorities of all Ukrainian cities, towns, and villages 
to delete the names of Communist officials (except the positions lower than the secretary 
of the district committee of the party, but including all the servicemen of Soviet state 
security services), as well as names connected to the Communist ideology and Soviet 
state symbols from Ukrainian toponyms. The implementation of those directives had to 
be adopted as official decisions on the local levels by local self-government bodies until 
October 9, 2015. If the local council would not fulfill the law, the renaming obligation 
was put on mayors. If the latter would not follow the law, the renaming should have been 
enacted by the head of the regional state administration (the official appointed by the 
president and the government of Ukraine) until April 9th 2016. So these directives 
preconditioned the fact that the majority of the renaming acts had been accomplished 
during 2015–2016. Nevertheless, many changes of street names and other toponyms 
were conducted between 2010–2013. In Kharkiv, for instance, the number of 2010–2013 
the streets’ renamings constitute around 1/3 of the total number of name changes in 
2010–2019. In some Ukrainian cities many renaming act were done between 2017–2019.  
Based on the findings of the aforementioned researches, as well as on a pilot study 
of Ukrainian political, ideological, and urbanistic processes of the 2010s, I hereby can 
define four hypotheses:  
The first hypothesis is based on the population statistics of the regional centers of 
Ukraine1 and on the assumption that a regional center has a greater influence on public 
opinion than any other city with a similar population in that region (see the Methods 
section below). The analysis of regional centers is less time-consuming than a 
comprehensive analysis of Ukrainian regional centers, supplemented by many other cities 
(with a population 100,00o or more)  of those regions. However, the analysis limited to 
 
1 Regional centers are the capitals of 24 regions of Ukraine, while regions are the main Ukrainian 
administrative and territorial units.  
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the regional centers presumably gives reliable results similar to those of complex analysis 
which includes every major city. 
The second hypothesis suggests that the newly adopted street nomenclature in 
Ukrainian regional centers reflects the balance of ideological influences, and accordingly, 
the balance of powers in that region. In other words, it reflects a system of values 
regarded as acceptable by the decision-makers of both national and the local levels, and 
by the majority of politically active local people. A political and social establishment 
needs to take prevailing values of local activists into account to avoid disloyal voting or 
an armed resistance. The majority of politically active citizens would rather choose to 
accept street names they don't like than face bullying, bankruptcy, imprisonment, and 
armed violence against themselves  in the case of rejection.. 
The third hypothesis assumes that the analysis of the newly adopted streets 
nomenclature would be very fruitful and informative if renaming dynamics would be 
traced not over several years but at least a decade. Such an approach could help 
researchers to define the origins and directions of the expansion of political values, 
opinions, and ideologies among national and local decision-makers and the majority of 
politically active local residents. 
The fourth hypothesis states that analysis of the newly adopted street 
nomenclature can reveal the differences between political statements and real intentions 
of the majority of politically active local influential people.  
 
Methods  
The study of the street renaming covers 22 Ukrainian cities that are the regional centers, 
i.e. the capitals of Ukraine’s 24 oblasts. Out of 24 oblasts mentioned in constitution, the 
central cities of two (Donets’k and Luhans’k) are outside of control by the government of 
Ukraine after the spring of 2014 and until the time this article is written. Since these two 
regional centers were de facto outside of Ukrainian official policies and ideological 
processes, they were not included in my analysis. 
According to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, as of January 1st 2014, the 
population of Ukraine stood at approximately 45,426,000 (rounded to the thousands). 
This included around 8,551,000 in Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Ukrstat 
2014). The last Ukrainian census was carried out in 2001. The majority of Ukrainian 
experts considered the official figures of the total Ukrainian population as a gross 
overestimation, while the population of the largest Ukrainian cities as an 
underestimation. An example to support this shows that in 2016 the population of Kyiv 
was officially around 2.9 million people, according to the State Statistics Committee of 
Ukraine (Ukrstat 2017). The Deputy Head of Kyiv City State Administration said that 4 
million people were living in Kyiv and 0.3 million people visited daily for work purposes 
(Kievvlast 2016). 
As of January 1st, 2014, the population total of the foregoing 22 cities officially 
stood around 12,194,000 (rounded to the thousands). This figure was about ⅓ of 
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36,875,000, the official estimation of the 22 oblasts’ population (Ukrstat 2014). During 
the 2010s, the population of the regional centers could reach ½ of the population of 
these 22 oblasts, taking into account all-Ukrainian trends of urbanization (World Bank 
2016). 
Population is not the only advantage of regional centers, they are also important 
as trendsetters for other cities and towns. There are many cities in Ukraine that are not 
the capitals of oblasts, but their population is larger than the population of some regional 
centers. However, as a rule the influence of regional centers on the region's public opinion 
is larger than the influence of the region's other cities, even if the population of that other 
city is larger than the population of the regional center. The reason for this is that such 
cities are the headquarters of political, economic, and cultural activity of the region. They 
are perceived as the centers of power and prestige by the majority population of the 
region. With this in mind, the character of the street renaming in the regional center has 
a significant impact on the renaming in the subordinated cities. In reality, there is a high 
probability of copying the practice of the leading city in the practice of less important 
(and perhaps, even more populated) cities of the oblast. 
The term Streets in this study is used in the meaning that includes all the streets, 
lanes, avenues, squares, passages, and embankments in the city, and not only those that 
are situated in the city center. Parks are not included to the category of Streets here. It 
should be noted, that the number of parks renamed in the 2010s in the 22 regional 
centers are at least 60 times less than the total number of the renamed objects included 
to the term Streets. 
Predominantly, the websites of city councils were used as the sources of the 
information about the street renamings. In some cases, the publications in local and 
central mass media were used as well. A total of around 200 such sources were used to 
fill in data Tables 2 and 3.    
The Streets were divided into 12 groups (Themes) in this study in Table 1. Themes 
of new names as follows. 
Table 1. Themes of new names  
Number 
of the 
Theme 
Themes of new names 
1 Chieftains and princes of Ukrainian lands in the 10th–to the first half of the 16th century. 
2 Symbols, famous personalities of Ukrainian Cossacks, insurgent movements in the second 
half of the 16th century and until the end of the 18th century. 
3 Symbols, activists of the Central Council of Ukraine (Central Rada, Tsentralna rada), the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic (Ukrainian National Republic, UNR), the West Ukrainian People’s 
Republic (Ukrainian: Zakhidnoukrayins’ka Narodna Respublika, ZUNR), Pavlo Skoropadskyi’s 
Ukrainian State (Hetmanate), and anti-Bolshevik rebellions between 1917–1922. 
4 Activists of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and  the Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army (Ukrainian: Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya, UPA) between the 1930s 
– 1950s.  
5 Symbols, activists of the Maidan 2013–2014 (Revolution of Dignity, Euromaidan Revolution, 
just Euromaidan) and the armed conflict in the Donbas region (started in 2014). 
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6 Ukrainian prominent figures in culture, science, economy, sports, as well as civic activists. 
Those whom the Russian Empire and/or the Bolsheviks, the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union regarded as dangerous enemies*. 
7 Ukrainian or born in Ukraine, prominent figures in culture, science, economy, sports, as well 
as civic activists. Those whom the Russian Empire and/or the Bolsheviks, the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union didn’t regard as dangerous enemies*. 
8 Soviet armed groups and their activists. 
9 Apolitical names, not in honor of a prominent historical figure. 
10 Orthodox holidays, saints, hierarchs, and religious propagandists. 
11 Non-Orthodox holidays, saints, hierarchs, and religious propagandists. 
12 Other. 
*As for the 6th and 7th items of this list, the expression "to regard as dangerous enemies" means that a 
person was regarded as an enemy combatant, or he (she), for his (her) political disloyalty (real or false), was 
jailed for a month at least, or repressed by means of the exile to another region, or killed. 
Such groupings of new toponyms is appropriate for several reasons: 
1. At least some of the Themes must coincide with some other themes in 
the subgroups presented by Gnatiuk. This is in accordance with the 
respective historical context: “Cossack State (approximately); Ukrainian 
Struggle for Independence between 1917–1922; Ukrainian Insurgent Army 
and related liberation movements,” to get comparable data for the testing 
the first hypothesis. 
2. Several gaps of the previous studies needed to be filled: Theme 5 and 
Theme 7 (not just a wider subgroup ‘Independent Ukraine’ of Gnatiuk), to 
specify the uniting and separating potential of the commemoration of the 
personalities and symbols. 
3. The Themes must reflect certain classic narratives, systems of heroes, 
symbols that have been disseminated in certain Ukrainian regions for a 
longer or shorter period than in other regions. For example, Theme 8 
(shorter in western regions) is purposeful to test the second hypothesis. 
A comparative analysis is applied to prove all the hypotheses of this study. The 
regional centers are compared with each other by new names of the streets. Those new 
names are compared to the history of the region. Some results of this study are compared 
to Gnatiuk’s (Gnatiuk, 2018) and some other publications, mainly about the names of the 
streets in the European Union. An absolute number of the newly adopted nomenclature 
of streets is calculated for each of the 22 cities, for the period between 2010–2019, as 
well as the number per 10,000 inhabitants. The cities are compared among themselves 
according to these criteria. 
 
Results and discussion 
The main calculations are presented in Table 2 Percentage of the total number of the streets 
renamed in a given city below. The Themes in the second row of Table 2 are indicated by 
the numbers that correspond to the sequence number of the Theme in Table 1. Themes 
of new names. As an example, number 8 as a title of a column means Theme 8: “Soviet 
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armed groups and their activists.” The figures 10–19 in the left column mean the period 
between 2010–2019 years. Respectively, the figures 14–19 mean the period between 
2014–2019. The figures 14–17 mean the period from the beginning of 2014 to 
September of 2017. Furthermore, the figures 17–19 mean the period from October 2017 
to the end of 2019. The absence of figures in the cell of the left column, excluding the 
highest figure, refers to the period between 2010–2019.  
Table 2. Percentage of the total number of the streets renamed in a given city  
City & period Percentage of the total number of the renamed streets in a given city, %. The themes marked 
by their serial numbers from Table 1 (e.g. “8” means “Soviet armed groups and their activists” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Kyiv10-19 0.5 2.9 7.6 2.4 4.8 17.0 20.0 0.5 30.5 5.2 1.4 8.1 
Kyiv 14-17 0.6 2.4 9.6 0.6 3.0 17.6 18.8 0.6 33.3 4.8 1.2 7.3 
Kyiv 17-19 0 4.4 4.4 2.2 11.1 13.3 24.4 0 20.0 4.4 2.2 11.1 
Kharkiv 10-19 0.3 1.6 0.3 0 0.5 4.3 28.1 1.9 51.4 3.2 0 8.4 
Kharkiv 14-19 0.4 1.7 0.4 0 0.8 4.2 30.8 0.8 52.3 4.6 0 3.8 
Odessa 10-19 0 16.7 1.9 0 3.7 0 24.1 9.3 35.2 3.7 0 7.4 
Odessa 14-19 0 20.5 2.3 0 4.5 0 18.2 9.1 34.1 4.5 0 4.5 
Dnipro 10-19 2.9 12.5 6.2 1.0 2.6 10.1 24.7 0.7 31.3 2.6 0 5.9 
Dnipro 14-19 3.1 11.3 6.5 1.0 2.7 10.7 24.7 0.7 30.9 2.7 0 4.8 
Zaporizhia 0 4.9 3.0 0 10.3 3.6 21.8 5.5 37.0 3.6 0 10.3 
Lviv 0 0 0 0 50.0 0 0 0 50.0 0 0 0 
Mykolaiv 1.7 5.8 1.7 0 1.7 3.3 14.1 0 53.7 9.1 0.8 8.3 
Vinnytsia 2.8 6.2 6.7 1.7 2.8 12.9 30.9 2.8 18.0 2.3 1.1 11.8 
Kherson 2.0 7.1 5.1 0 2.6 9.2 15.8 0 45.9 4.6 0 7.1 
Poltava 0.9 7.4 11.1 2.8 4.6 7.4 39.8 2.8 13.9 5.6 0 3.7 
Chernihiv 0 7.8 5.8 1.0 3.9 6.8 29.1 1.0 30.1 6.8 0 7.8 
Cherkasy 0 11.4 5.0 1.0 19.8 5.0 17.8 0 34.2 1.5 0 4.0 
Zhytomyr 0.8 4.2 15.8 5.0 5.0 11.7 15.0 0.8 25.8 3.3 2.5 10.0 
Sumy 2.2 6.5 12.0 2.2 7.6 9.8 25.0 0 22.8 1.1 2.2 8.7 
Khmelnytskyi 1.8 1.8 8.9 7.1 3.6 8.9 28.6 0 19.6 5.4 3.6 10.7 
Chernivtsi 15.
5 
8.5 1.4 1.4 8.5 5.6 21.1 0 23.9 1.4 1.4 11.3 
Rivne 0 0 11.8 5.9 11.8 5.9 23.5 0 23.5 0 0 17.7 
Kropyvnytskyi 0 6.6 3.6 0.6 19.3 7.8 18.1 6.0 29.6 3.6 0 4.8 
Ivano-Frankivsk  0 5.3 0 5.3 15.8 15.8 15.8 0 5.3 0 31.
6 
5.3 
Ternopil 0 0 50 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lutsk 10-19 2.7 2.7 9.5 5.4 0 5.4 18.9 2.7 27 4.1 5.4 16.2 
Lutsk 14-19  0 0 5 10 0 20 10 0 10 15 0 10 
Uzhhorod 0 0 6.9 6.9 31.0 3.5 34.5 0 6.9 0 0 10.3 
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Total * 
2010-2019 
1.7 6.0 6.4 2.5 7.2 7.7 23.3 1.7 28.3 3.1 3.4 8.9 
*Ternopil and Lviv are excluded. 
These data show that the total quantity of the streets renamed in 22 regional 
centers in 2010–2019 is 2445. Arithmetic mean is calculated for every Theme of 
renamings for the period between 2010–2019, for 20 cities (excluding Ternopil and Lviv, 
due to an extremely small quantity of the renamings in these 2 cities). In Kharkiv, where 
only ⅔ of the newly adopted street nomenclature occurred since 2014, the difference 
between the periods 2010–2013 and 2014–2019 doesn’t seem significant. An exception 
to this can be seen in Theme 8 (“Soviet armed groups and their activists,” a decrease 
during 2014–2019) and Theme 10 (“Orthodox holidays, saints, hierarchs and religious 
propagandists,” an increase during 2014–2019). 
Equally important, a very specific situation took place in Odessa: Mikheil 
Saakashvili, the Head of the Odessa Oblast State Administration, signed the order to 
rename 51 streets of the city. However, this decision was later canceled (as with most of 
the items in the list) by the Odessa City Council. In this study, the names of the streets 
are described as for the end of December, 2019. Those names were fixed In Odessa  
according to the city council’s version of the nomenclature of streets, not Saakashvili’s 
version. Consequently, the quantity of the streets renamed in Odessa during 2014–2019 
was actually around ⅘ of the renamings that occurred during 2010–2019. The difference 
between these periods was rather significant for Theme 2 (increase during 2014–2019) 
and Theme 7 (decrease during 2014–2019). 
Only about 5% of the street renamings occurred since 2014 in Dnipro. Therefore, 
the difference between the periods 2010–2013 and 2014–2019  is mainly insignificant. 
Although this may be true, two Themes should still be noted: Theme 2 (decrease), Theme 
3 (increase), and Theme 6 (increase) during 2014–2019. 
As for Lutsk, a drastic change is detected: the share of Theme 5 increased 
significantly while Theme 7 and Theme 9 dropped down. It should be noted that only 37 
streets were renamed there during 2010–2019, including 10 streets between 2014–
2019.   
Finally, Kyiv with its 212 streets renamed during 2010–2019, only a few of them 
before 2014, and around 45 of the streets renamed since October 2017. From the 
evidence, one can see during the period between 2014–2017 (compared with the period 
2017–2019) a significant decrease in Theme 3, Theme 6, and Theme 9. In contrast, a 
significant increase is shown in Theme 4 and Theme 5. 
Theme 9, ‘Apolitical names’, (i.e. named not in honor of a prominent historical 
figure), in this analysis is approximately identical to the composition of non-
commemorative groups proposed by Gnatiuk (2018): restored historical names, 
topographic names, and poetic (or figurative) names. The results of this analysis and 
Gnatiuk’s analysis are similar. Gnatiuk states that the total share of non-commemorative 
toponyms increases from the west to the south-east (Gnatiuk 2018: 7). This study proves 
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the same (See Theme 9 in the Table 2). The causes of this phenomena seem to be 
described precisely by Gnatiuk (2018).  
Similar results in the theme of Ukrainian Cossacks of the 16th–18th centuries are 
demonstrated both in this study and in Gnatiuk's one. Gnatiuk is right stating that the 
newly adopted street names in honor of Ukrainian Cossacks are presented in the vast 
majority of cities (with a population more than 100,000) in the test regions. These names 
make up a significantly large share in the south-eastern part of Ukraine, especially in the 
cities along the Dnieper River (Gnatiuk 2018). However, this study shows the results that 
are not similar to Gnatiuk’s results with regards to Mykolaiv, Rivne, and Uzhhorod. In 
foregoing cities, this study detects modest level of Cossacks-related names in Mykolaiv. 
On the other hand, Gnatiuk detects a very high level in Mykolaiv. This is with the absence 
of Cossack-related renamings in Rivne and Uzhhorod, while Gnatiuk detects a rather high 
level of this theme. 
Based on Table 2 of this study, one should agree with the opinion of Gnatiuk that 
the streets named after the figures, organizations, and events related to Ukrainian 
Cossack formations, are detected (as for the renamings during 2010s) in the territory 
where the Cossacks operated, in the locations of their settlements and states). 
However, Gnatiuk has created a problem that baffled him: ‘How to explain the high 
proportion of names related to the Cossack epoch in the western cities […] Uzhhorod and 
Rivne, where the role of Cossacks in local history was minimal?’ (2018). He also notices 
the very issue, though to a lesser extent, in Mykolaiv and Kherson ‘as these cities were 
founded and intensely developed during the Russian Empire occupation without the 
direct participation of Cossacks’ (Gnatiuk, 2018). 
Some remarks need to be added with regards to the citation. Firstly, Cossack states 
are not reflected in Uzhhorod street renaming in 2010s, according to Table 2 and 
therefore, this problem does not exist. Secondly, according to Table 2, as well as to the 
history of Ukraine, the share of the Cossack theme in the street renaming in Mykolaiv and 
Kherson seems rather pertinent and proportional to the share of Ukrainian Cossacks in 
local history. This remains in the collective memory of the inhabitants of Ukrainian Black 
Sea Coast, since this is the area of the operations of the army called Black Sea Cossacks 
(Chornomorske kozatstvo). Members of this army and, partly, descendants of these 
Cossacks took active part in the colonization of Mykolaiv and Kherson regions. 
As for Uzhhorod, some discrepancies in the results of 2 studies are also noted with 
regards to Theme 4 (the commemoration of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists 
and  the Ukrainian Insurgent Army). However, the whole picture of the distribution of this 
theme on the map of Ukraine is rather similar in the article by Gnatiuk (2018) and in Table 
2. In both studies, Kmelnytskyi is the leading city, Lutsk trailing behind it, while 
Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Mykolaiv ignore the commemoration of this theme. 
There also many other coincidences with regards to the theme, they are detected in the 
majority of regions. 
A huge number of streets named after the prominent figures in culture, science, 
economy, and sports are noteworthy. By the same token, what is especially interesting 
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are the proportions of those who were regarded and those who were not regarded as 
dangerous enemies by the authorities of the Russian Empire and/or the Bolsheviks, 
afterwards Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
As can be seen in Table 2, the share of non-repressed persons is only a little higher 
than the share of repressed persons reflected in the names of the streets of Kyiv: 20% vs. 
17%. There is a similar proportion in Zhytomyr: (15.0% vs. 11.7%), and Ivano-Frankivsk: 
(15.8% vs. 15.8%). Unlike the proportion in Dnipro 24.7% vs. 10.1%, and in Zaporizhia — 
21.8% vs. 3.6%. Kharkiv shows — 28.1% vs. 4.3%, Odessa — 24.1% vs. 0%, and Poltava — 
39.8% vs. 7.4%. 
A large difference in the case of Uzhhorod (34.5% vs.3.5%) could be explained by 
the history of this region, which was controlled by the Soviet Union in the years that 
started after the majority of the main repressive waves had already been passed in 
Ukrainian parts of the Russian Empire (against Ukrainian Cossack autonomy in the 18th 
century, against disloyal activists, propagandists, rebels, since the middle of the 19th 
century) and the USSR (the repressions of 1918–1921 and 1929–1941). The same 
explanation looks believable with regards to Chernivtsi (21.1% vs. 5.6%). This point could 
partly explain the proportions for Lutsk and Rivne: their regions spent the period 1921–
1939 as the parts of Polish state. Khmelnytskyi (28.6% vs. 8.9%) and Kherson (15.8% vs. 
9.2%) are atypical for the total Ukrainian distribution of proportions, thus making it 
difficult to explain. Generally speaking, the difference between the quantities of non-
repressed and repressed persons in the couples increases from the west to the south, and 
the east. 
The leading cities in the commemoration of Soviet military formations and 
individuals (Theme 8) are: Odessa (9.3% of the renamed streets there), Kropyvnytskyi 
(6.0%), and Zaporizhia (5.5%). 
Theme 5 is one of the most interesting aspects of the street renaming in Ukraine: 
the commemoration of the Maidan 2013–2014 (Revolution of Dignity, Euromaidan 
Revolution, just Euromaidan) and the armed conflict in the Donbas region (started in 
2014). The leading cities in this theme are: Uzhhorod (31.0% of the renamed streets 
there), Cherkasy (19.8%), Kropyvnytskyi (19.3%). The cities that show a minimal activity 
in this theme are: Lutsk (0%), Kharkiv (0.5%), and Mykolaiv (1.7%). Another point to outline 
is the average for 20 regional centers stands at 7.2%. It is the 4th in the ranking of the 11 
Themes (the 12th is ‘Other’) by popularity.  
According to the calculations of the Ukrainian volunteers web project (Zahybli, 
2019) (as for the middle of 2019), Uzhhorod region had one of the smallest absolute and 
relative numbers of Ukrainian servicemen and volunteers who were killed in action in 
Donbas, since the beginning of the war. This was among the numbers of other Ukrainian 
regions. Cherkasy was approximately in the middle of the losses ranking, in absolute and 
relative numbers. Kropyvnytskyi’s region (Kirovohrad Oblast) was higher than the middle, 
but not at the top of the ranking. Likewise, Lutsk’s region (Volyn Oblast) had a position 
similar to Kropyvnytskyi’s (near the top). In contrast, Kharkiv region had one of the 
smallest absolute and relative numbers. However, Mykolaiv was approximately in the 
middle of the ranking. 
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As a result, any significant correlations between the share of the victims of the 
Donbas war in the street names and the share or absolute figure of local people died in 
Donbas, are absent. 
Theme 10 and Theme 11 (both about religion) have a relatively low popularity. 
The average for 20 regional centers: 3.1% and 3.4%, respectively, in the ranking of the 11 
Themes. Only Theme 1 and Theme 8 are in a lower position. Moreover, a significant 
number of the renamings in Theme 10 (Orthodox) were just the restoring of old names, 
from the Russian Empire era. There are streets named in honor of local Orthodox temples, 
more than a century ago. 
According to the Pew Research Center’s surveys conducted between 2015–2017, 
Ukraine was positioned 11th in the rank of 34 European countries, by religious 
commitment. In Ukraine, 35% said they attend worship services at least monthly (How do 
European, 2018). 
Theme 11 ‘Non-Orthodox holidays, saints, hierarchs, and religious propagandists’ 
is only popular in a few regions. This is mainly due to the streets named after the hierarchs 
of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Such renamings were done in Kyiv, Lutsk, Ivano-
Frankivsk, and some other cities. Almost all of them are in the regions with a significant 
presence of the believers of the foregoing religious organization. 
Several Roman Catholic figures are also mentioned: mainly, in the regions with a 
high concentration of Polish minority population in Ukraine. The figure of Pope John Paul 
II is commemorated not only in such regions, but also in several other regions. 
Protestantism is absent in the names of the renamed streets in the regional centers during 
2010–2019. Meanwhile, the percentage of Roman Catholics stands between 0.6–1.8%, 
and the number of Protestants is around 0.6–2.2% of the population of Ukraine during 
2018–2019 (Osoblyvosti, 2018; Konfesijna, 2019). 
It could be thought that Protestants had smaller presence in the groups of 
ideological decision makers than Roman Catholics. As far as their religious identity was 
not presented proportionally in the newly adopted  toponyms of the regional centers. 
What is more interesting are the signs of an international identity: of the interest 
for the objects that are not related directly to Ukraine. Soviet Russian scientist and 
dissident Andrei Sakharov and cinema artist Nikolay Rybnikov, Soviet Azerbaijanian 
singer Muslim Magomayev, as well as Scouts are all commemorated in the renamed 
streets of Dnipro. 
More than a dozen regional centers named their streets after Pope John Paul II. A 
street named in honor of Ludwik Zamenhof (the inventor of the international language 
Esperanto) appeared in Kherson. Furthermore, Polish-Jewish educator and writer Janusz 
Korczak, Polish writer and the promoter of Polish-Ukrainian alliance Jerzy Giedroyc, Czech 
statesman and writer Vaclav Havel, and American anti-Russian and pro-Maidan senator 
John McCain were all commemorated in Kyiv. The president of Poland Lech Kaczyński 
was commemorated in the names of streets in Zhytomyr and Khmelnytskyi (the areas of 
the mostly dense settlement of Poles in Ukraine). The foregoing names are almost in all 
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such cases among the renamings (among 2445 streets) that commemorated people, 
which were not related to Ukraine by settlement or ancestry. 
A few streets were named after the so-called Vasyl Vyshyvani, Archduke Wilhelm 
Franz of Austria, later Wilhelm Franz von Habsburg-Lothringen, also known as Basil the 
Embroidered. He took active part in Ukrainian political life. Furthermore, a street in 
Uzhhorod was named after a Czechoslovak politician, statesman, sociologist, and 
philosopher Thomas Masaryk, who had been the figure of the all-European scale, but it is 
no wonder Uzhhorod was a part of Czechoslovakia between 1920–1939.  
In Chernivtsi 2 streets were named after 2 Austrian regions, but Chernivtsi was a 
part of the Habsurg monarchy for more than a century. In addition, some streets were 
named after American singer Kvitka Cisyk whose parents were Ukrainian nationals. Not 
to mention, few streets received the name ‘European street’ (in Poltava and Zaporizhia). 
This concludes the reflection of international identity in the renamed streets of 
the 22 Ukrainian regional centers. A key point to mention is that in Kyiv are less than 3% 
non-related ethnically or by years of living in Ukraine persons’ and symbols' 
commemorations of the total number of the renamed streets (between 2010–2019). In 
actual fact, there are less than 1% of such streets in the half of other regional cities and 
0% or almost 0% in the other half.  
Let’s compare this approach with the first renamings that were done by the 
Bolsheviks in Kyiv in 1919: approximately 14% of the renamed streets were the 
commemoration of the persons who were not Ukrainians and did not originate from 
Ukraine nor did they live in Ukraine (Prykaz, 1919).  
The share of the streets named after non-Ukrainian, non-Russian, and non-Soviet 
figures were more than 5% in the last years of the USSR, in Ukrainian regional centers. 
Furthermore, when comparing these facts with Slovakia: in the beginning of the 
2010s, a total of 13% of the toponyms of international importance was fixed in the 
historical centers of all 8 Slovakian regional cities (Bucher et. al., 2013).  
A further point is there are streets named after American President Franklin 
Roosevelt (rather positive figure in Soviet and Ukrainian historiography and collective 
memory) in Cannes, Lyon, Paris, Toulouse, Brussels, in many Polish cities, and in other 
European countries. However, his name is absent in the new names of the streets in 
Ukrainian regional centers. The same situation further relates to many other prominent 
figures of the 20th century.  
A final point, the Street Renaming Coefficient (SRC) is calculated for every test city. 
The method proceeds as follows: the number of the streets renamed in a certain city 
during 2010–2019, is calculated per 10,000 citizens of the city. As a result, the scale of 
the changes in the local balance of ideology, identity, as well as the directions of these 
changes could be measured, both in geographical and semantic aspects. 
As one can see in Table 3 Street Renaming Coefficient (SRC), there are no significant 
correlations between the size of the population and the value of the SRC (for this place 
and country). However, 2 types of cities could be distinguished:  
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1. Cities with insignificant changes of toponyms. 
2. Cities with significant changes of toponyms. 
The majority of the first type of cities are grouped densely (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, 
and Ternopil) in Western Ukraine. Moreover, Kyiv and Odessa belong to this type.   
Table 3. Street Renaming Coefficient (SRC) 
City Population, thousands* 
Street Renaming Coefficient  
(SRC) 
(the number of the streets 
renamed between 2010–2019, 
per 10,000 citizens) 
Kyiv 2,869 0.7 
Kharkiv 2010–2013 1,451 2.6 
Kharkiv 2014–2019 1,451 1.6 
Odessa  1,017 0.5 
Dnipro  993 3.1 
Zaporizhia 766 2.1 
Lviv 729 0 
Mykolaiv 495 2.4 
Vinnytsia 372 4.8 
Kherson 298 3.3 
Poltava 296 3.6 
Chernihiv 296 3.4 
Cherkasy 285 3.5 
Zhytomyr 271 4.4 
Sumy 269 3.4 
Khmelnytskyi 266 2.1 
Chernivtsi 262 2.7 
Rivne 250 1.4 
Kropyvnytskyi 233 7.2 
Ivano-Frankivsk  227 0.8 
Ternopil 217 0.1 
Lutsk  216 1.7 
Uzhhorod 116 2.4 
*As for January 1st, 2014, according to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 
 
Conclusion 
This research proves that the newly adopted nomenclature of streets in the regional 
Ukrainian centers contains information that is very similar to the findings of the study 
that is based on more time-consuming methods: the analysis of all the cities with a 
IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS JOURNAL 
© 2020 Foundation for Good Politics   ISSN 2227-6068 
_____________________________________________ 
№ 2(16), 2020                                                                                                                                                                                       
337 
population more than 100,000 people. Limiting the object of a study to to the regional 
centers. i.e. excluding other cities, is so effective due to the fact that policies of 
administrative centers are often mirrored by the subordinate cities and towns. 
This specific feature supposedly works more powerfully in the regions with a long 
history of authoritarian centralized power and not in the traditionally decentralized 
regions. 
During the 2010s Ukraine has been facing strong local opposition, specified for 
every region in this research. That is despite the efforts of dominant political groups to 
monopolize the information space by removing and/or reducing the alternative historical 
and political narratives. The pressure coming from the UINM, Ukrainian government, 
parliament, and the majority of the Ukrainian mass media, not to mention expert 
communities was not able to overcome completely the pressure coming from below, 
namely  from local carriers of pro-Russian, pro-Soviet, and simply pro-local narratives, 
values, identities, and interests. The research demonstrates a set of influences on 
Ukrainian street nomenclature, greatly proving the following thesis: local groups of 
decision-makers (politically active local influential people) and their active supporters 
persistently and successfully ignored the significant part of those ideological narratives 
that were promoted by the top of Ukrainian political and ideological power. Despite all 
the political changes between 2014-2015, local communities resisted this promotion 
greatly and won numerous cases.  
A connecting key point to emphasize is the loyalty of the majority of the 
population, mainly in the southern and eastern regions of the country, to the President, 
the Government of Ukraine, as well as the dominant ideology of the state during the 
2010s. It looked rather fragile and superficial according to the analysis of the street 
renaming in the regional centers of Ukraine. The renaming dynamics analysis significantly 
helps to study the attitudes of citizens towards the state ideology and rulers. The study 
of the street names in the regional centers reveals some gaps between the officially 
announced values, on the one hand, and those that are considered as worth the effort, 
expense, and relate to the point of view of the vast majority of the Ukrainian population, 
on the other hand. Such a gap is detected in regard to the Eurointegration aspirations of 
Ukraine, which has been the crux of Ukrainian official rhetoric, both inside and outside of 
the country for the most part of the period between 2010–2019. The same phenomenon 
is defined in regard to religious aspirations. 
The whole method, with particular attention to the SRC created in the process of 
the research, could help to find the origins, to trace directions for the leaders of the 
ideological changes, and to accurately measure these processes. In the case of Ukraine 
during the 2010s, the greatest ideological changes reflected in the street names took 
place in Vinnytsia and Kropyvnytskyi. On the other hand, there were no changes made in 
Lviv and Ternopil. Their street names have seemingly become a standard for the rest of 
the country. 
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